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1. Introduction: Models of active perception
In this paper I focus on the notion of active perception in the context of medi-
eval philosophy, i.e., the question whether the perceptual process involves an 
activity of some kind on the part of the perceiving person. I argue that the 
notion of activity can be viewed from several positions. As an illustration, 
I introduce two diﬀ erent accounts of active perception, both proposed by 
Franciscan philosophers, namely Peter Olivi and Peter Auriol.
At present, the notion of perceptual activity tends to be associated with 
Kant and his conception of perception as involving both the sensation as 
matter passively received in our mind from without, and space and time as 
forms by means of which the mind actively “moulds” the matter and organ-
izes the sensations. In the premodern accounts of perception, passivist and 
objectivist features tend to be stressed. Nevertheless, some recent scholars 
have made increasingly obvious that premodern thinkers not only were able 
to account for the activity of the senses, but that they actually developed 
several diﬀ erent ways of treating such activity. However, none of these 
premodern accounts pushes the presumption of the activity of senses to the 
Kantian consequences – medieval thinkers do not assume that the cognitive 
powers make radical changes in the perceptual content by, e.g., projecting 
the categories of space and time onto reality. Generally speaking, medieval 
ͩ The research behind this article was supported by the project Collective Identity in the Social 
Networks of Medieval Europe (University of Ostrava, Faculty of Arts, IRP ͪͨͩͭͬͰ).
ͪ E.g. Kant, I., Critique of Pure Reason. Ed. and transl. P. Guyer – A. Wood. Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press ͩͱͱͰ, Aͩͱ–ͪͨ/Bͫͫ–ͫͬ, Aͬͪ/Bͭͱ, Aͩͮͯ/Bͪͨͱ, pp. ͩͭͭ–ͩͭͮ, ͩͰͭ, ͪͱͩ.
ͫ Esp. the papers collected in Silva, J. F. – Yrjönsuuri, M. (eds.), Active Perception in the History 
of Philosophy: From Plato to Modern Philosophy. Dordrecht, Springer ͪͨͩͬ.
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philosophers accounted for the activity of the senses in one (or more) of the 
four following ways:
(1) Activity as extramission: the senses (especially vision) are active, 
because an entity comes forth or is emitted from the sensory organs. 
 is entity is a real body made of a very subtle matter – either a visual 
ray of a ﬁ ery or luminous nature, as Platonists or proponents of the 
Euclidian geometrical optics supposed, or a visual spirit or pneuma, as 
Galenists argued.
(2) Activity as attention: the senses are active, because bringing about 
a perceptual act presupposes focusing the mind’s attention.  ere is no 
conscious perception without paying attention, as especially thinkers 
inﬂ uenced by Augustine argue.
(3) Causal activity: the sensory powers are active, because they cause 
the perceptual acts, as their total or partial eﬃ  cient cause.
(4) Active processing of the received information: according to this view, 
the activity of the senses consists in processing perceptual information 
and in the mind’s inﬂ uence in the production of conscious perceptual 
content.
Of course, in the individual authors these four perspectives often coalesce. 
 e present paper focuses on two Franciscan authors – Peter Olivi (ca. 1248–
–1298) and Peter Auriol (ca. 1280–1322). As I will show, Olivi stresses both 
(2) the attention of the senses and (3) their causal activity.  e total eﬃ  cient 
cause of a perceptual act is the sensory power; however, before the sense can 
cause its act, its attention must be focused on an external object and ﬁ xed 
upon it. Furthermore, in describing attention Olivi reinterprets the legacy 
ͬ Varieties of the extramission theory of sight were endorsed by several ancient and Musli m 
thinkers (Euclid, Ptolemy, Galen, Al-Kindi); in medieval Latin Europe, especially by some 
Platonis ts of the ͩͪth century (Bernard of Chartres, William of Conches, or Adelard of Bath). See 
e.g. Tachau, K. H., Approaching Medieval Scholars’ Treatment of Cognition. In: Pacheco, M. C. – 
Meirinhos, J. F. (eds.), Intellect et imagination dans la philosophie médiévale. Turnhout, Brepols 
ͪͨͨͮ, vol. ͩ, pp. ͩͫ–ͪͩ and note ͪͪ below.
ͭ The role of attention is stressed by Augustinians such as William of Auvergne, Matthew 
of Aqua sparta, Henry of Ghent, or Durand of St.-Pourçain. See e.g. Silva, J. F., Medieval Theories 
of Active Perception: An Overview. In: Silva, J. F. – Yrjönsuuri, M. (eds.), Active Perception in the 
History of Philosophy, op. cit., pp. ͩ ͩͯ–ͩͬͮ; or Pasnau, R., Theories of Cognition in the Later Middle 
Ages. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press ͩͱͱͯ, ch. ͬ.
ͮ This view was quite popular among the scholastics of ͩͫth to ͩͯth century – it is endorsed by 
Scotists or Jesuits; Averroists even postulate the so-called agent sense (sensus agens) to play 
the role of the cause of perception. See e.g. Heider, D., Francisco de Toledo, Francisco Suárez, 
Manuel de Góis and Antonio Rubio on the Activity and Passivity of the External Senses. In: 
Heider, D. (ed.), Cognitive Psychology in Early Jesuit Scholasticism. Neunkirchen-Seelscheid, Edi-
tiones Scholasticae ͪͨͩͮ, pp. ͫͰ–ͮͮ.
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of (1) the extramissionist theories of vision – the visual ray theory provides 
a useful model for explaining attention and attentional shifts.
In Peter Auriol’s view, the sensory powers are not the exclusive eﬃ  cient 
causes of their acts – rather, perception is an outcome in part of the causal 
activity of the objects, in part of (3) the causal activity of the power. Further, 
the activity of the sensory power consists in the fact that it (4) actively 
processes the received information and produces the perceptual content, or, 
in Auriol’s words, puts the external object into apparent being.
Finally, I consider both accounts in a context frequently mentioned by 
medieval thinkers, but sometimes neglected by modern scholars – the issue 
of mirror perception. Mirror perception is simply a situation when we see an 
object outside our visual ﬁ eld “by means of a ray reﬂ ected from the mirror” 
(per radium reﬂ ectum), as the medieval thinkers say.
In the Middle Ages, mirrors were regarded as peculiar and even marvel-
lous objects. For example, Olivi mentions that in his native language mirrors 
are called “miracles” (miracula) and looking into them is called “to marvel” 
(mirari). In fact, mirror perception reveals some interesting features of the 
perceptual process. Here, I consider two of these – the role of mirrors in 
attentional switching (in Olivi) and the metaphysics of the mirror image 
(according to Auriol).
2. Peter Olivi and attention
 e ﬁ rst model of active perception I consider here is the one developed by 
the Franciscan thinker Peter Olivi.	 As I have indicated above, the notion 
of activity is employed in Olivi’s theory of perception in several ways. First 
of all, the senses are active in a causal sense. If one asks what the eﬃ  cient 
cause of perception or of a perceptual act is, Olivi’s answer is that such a role 
belongs exclusively to the sensory power.

Olivi shares the Augustinian dualistic intuition that there are two onto-
logical spheres: the corporeal realm consisting of material objects and 
ͯ Peter Olivi, Quaestiones in secundum librum Sententiarum. Ed. B. Jansen. ͫ vols. Quaracchi, Col-
legium S. Bonaventurae ͩͱͪͪ–ͩͱͪͮ (abbrev. Sent. II), q. ͯͫ, vol. III, p. ͮͯ: “[…] specula in nostro 
vulgari vocamus miracula et speculari in eis vocamus mirari.” (Olivi is referring to his native lan-
guage – see ibid., pp. XIX–XX.)
Ͱ For Olivi’s account of sensory perception, see Tachau, K. H., Vision and Certitude in the Age 
of Ockham. Optics, Epistemology and the Foundations of Semantics, ͭͮͱͬ–ͭͯͰͱ. Leiden, Brill 
ͩͱͰͰ, pp. ͫͱ–ͭͬ; Pasnau, R., Theories of Cognition in the Later Middle Ages, op. cit., pp. ͩͫͨ–ͩͫͬ, 
ͩͮͰ– ͩ Ͱͩ; Perler, D., Theorien der Intentionalität im Mittelalter. Frankfurt/M., Vittorio Kloster-
mann ͪͨͨͬ, pp. ͩͨͱ–ͩͫͰ; and esp. Toivanen, J., Perception and the Internal Senses: Peter of John 
Olivi on the Cognitive Functions of the Sensitive Soul. Leiden, Brill ͪͨͩͫ.
ͱ Sent. II, q. ͯͬ, III, pp. ͩͪͬ–ͩͪͯ.
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bodies and the spiritual realm including (besides other things) souls and 
their powers. Whereas material objects are extended and non-vital, souls 
and their parts are unextended (and therefore simple) and vital.  e gap 
between these two realms is a salient one, which renders any causal inﬂ uence 
of a material object on the sensory power impossible (at least in the sense 
of eﬃ  cient causality). Since perceptual acts are vital (they are processes 
performed by living beings) and unextended (they cannot be localized) and 
they inherit these two features from their cause or principle, their cause 
must evince these properties – even in a higher degree than the acts them-
selves. Obviously, the only possible candidate here is the sensory power 
itself.  e eﬃ  cient cause of a perceptual act is not the material object we 
perceive by means of this act, but the sensory power that produces it.
Furthermore, the causal activity of our sensory powers is testiﬁ ed to not 
only by metaphysical reasoning, but also by our own inner experience. As 
Olivi points out, we have an innermost and continuous experience (intima et 
continua experientia) that cognitive acts are eﬃ  ciently caused by our cogni-
tive powers and that we grasp extramental objects by means of these acts 
(active quodammodo capere et tenere ipsa obiecta). If the primacy of the 
causal activity of the cognitive powers was denied, the human soul would be 
reduced like a trunk without branches or a shapeless mass of matter (sicut 
truncus et quasi moles materialis). (However, as I argue below, the objects 
also exert a causal inﬂ uence in the perceptual process.)
Besides the eﬃ  cient causal activity of the power in producing the percep-
tual act, Olivi also emphasizes another active element of the perceptual 
process – the notion of attention. He believes that – to be able to cause 
its act – every cognitive power must be in a conscious or attentive state 
ͩͨ E.g. Sent. II, q. ͯͪ, III, pp. ͩͰ–ͪͯ. This metaphysical foundation of Olivi’s theory of perception is 
well documented in the literature – see e.g. Pasnau, R., Theories of Cognition in the Later Middle 
Ages, op. cit., pp. ͩͯͮ–ͩͰͩ; Toivanen, J., Perception and the Internal Senses, op. cit., pp. ͪͭ–ͬͪ; 
Silva, J. F., Medieval Theories of Active Perception, op. cit., pp. ͩͫͪ–ͩͫͭ. Olivi’s convictions are 
connected to his highly elaborate criticism of theories of perception based (at least according 
to him) on the passive nature of the senses. Olivi criticised not only Aristotelian theories, but 
also Augustinian ones in this way. See Sent. II, q. ͭͰ, II, pp. ͬͮͩ–ͭͩͭ and Toivanen, J., Perception 
and the Internal Senses, op. cit., pp. ͩͩͱ–ͩͫͱ.
ͩͩ Sent. II, q. ͯͪ, III, p. ͪͭ: “[…] principium actus cognoscendi oportet […] esse altius et vitalius et 
radicalius et spiritui intimius quam sit ipse actus cognoscendi.”
ͩͪ Sent. II, q. ͭͰ, II, p. ͬͮͫ; q. ͯͪ, II, pp. ͪͪ, ͪͫ.
ͩͫ Sent. II, q. ͯͬ, III, p. ͩͪͬ; also Sent. II, q. ͭͰ, II, pp. ͬͮͫ–ͬͮͬ; q. ͯͪ, III, p. ͪͬ.
ͩͬ Sent. II, q. ͯͬ, III, p. ͩͪͮ.
ͩͭ For an elaborate account of Olivi on attention see Pasnau, R., Theories of Cognition in the Later 
Middle Ages, op. cit., pp. ͩͫͨ–ͩͫͬ, ͩͮͰ–ͩͰͩ; Perler, D., Theorien der Intentionalität im Mittelalter, 
op. cit., pp. ͩͫͬ–ͩͫͰ; Toivanen, J., Perception and the Internal Senses, op. cit., pp. ͪͭ–ͬͪ, ͩͬͩ–ͩͱͩ.
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and must be focused on an object. Olivi calls this distinct feature aspectus, 
intentio or conversio.
He cites some experiences to prove that perceptual acts necessarily demand 
one’s attention to be focused. For example, sleeping persons cannot perceive 
anything because they are unconscious and thus unable to attend the object. 
Further, Olivi refers to a phenomenon, which is at present called “selective 
attention”: even when we are conscious, we may fail to notice something in 
our visual ﬁ eld, simply because our attention is focused on something else. 
 ere is also the example of people in very deep sleep or of infants in the 
mother’s womb. In such cases, the attentive state is completely taken away 
from the cognitive powers (retractio) and, consequently, no cognitive act can 
occur. Hence, attention (aspectus) is a necessary condition of every percep-
tual act and without focusing attention on a concrete object the cognitive 
power cannot exert causal action and create its act.	
And ﬁ nally, I will argue that Olivi’s account of active perception is consid-
erably inﬂ uenced by the extramission theories of vision – he treats it not 
only in a negative way, but also in a positive one.
 Judging from the authors 
he quotes and theories he refers to, Olivi was not acquainted with the propo-
nents of extramission from the tradition of geometrical optics (e.g. Euclid, 
Ptolemy, or Al-Kindi); he rather mentions and criticizes “Platonists”, esp. 
Augustine. Nevertheless, Augustine mentions extramission only on rare 
occasions and it does not seem possible to build a complex theory upon 
them. Although Olivi was aware of them, he seems to have had a more 
ͩͮ Sent. II, q. ͯͫ, III, p. Ͱͱ or Peter Olivi, Quodlibeta quinque. Ed. S. Defraia. Grottaferrata, Colle-
gium S. Bonaventurae ͪͨͨͪ (abbrev. Quodl.), I, q. ͯ, p. ͪͮ.
ͩͯ Sent. II, q. ͭͱ, II, p. ͭͭͪ.
ͩͰ Sent. II, q. ͯ ͪ, III, p. ͱ. The thought experiment of “a man before the creation” proposed by Olivi 
can also be read as an argument for the necessity of attention for perception to occur. See Toi-
vanen, J., The Fate of the Flying Man: Medieval Reception of Avicenna’s Thought Experiment. 
In: Pasnau, R. (ed.), Oxford Studies in Medieval Philosophy, Vol. ͫ. Oxford, Oxford University 
Press ͪͨͩͭ, pp. Ͱͮ–ͱͬ for analysis of the argument.
ͩͱ In the literature, especially the negative part of Olivi’s view on extramission is mentioned – see, 
e.g., Tachau, K. H., Vision and Certitude in the Age of Ockham, op. cit., p. ͭͩ; Pasnau, R., Theories 
of Cognition in the Later Middle Ages, op. cit., pp. ͩͮͱ–ͩͯͨ; Toivanen, J., Perception and the In-
ternal Senses, op. cit., pp. ͩͫͮ–ͩͫͯ. Here I would like to accentuate the positive infl uence that 
the extramission theories may have had on Olivi and hereby corroborate the point briefl y sug-
gested by Silva, J. F. – Toivanen, J., The Active Nature of the Soul in Sense Perception: Robert 
Kilwardby and Peter Olivi. Vivarium, ͬͰ, ͪͨͩͨ, No. ͫ, pp. ͪͯͪ–ͪͯͭ. (See also Demange, D. Olivi 
et les Perspectivi. Oliviana, ͭ, ͪͨͩͮ. URL: <http://oliviana.revues.org/Ͱͭͨ> – an up-to-date paper 
on Olivi’s relationship to the perspectivist tradition, which cannot be taken into consideration 
here.)
ͪͨ Augustine mentions that visual rays (or the power of sight itself) are emitted from the eyes in 
De musica VI, Ͱ.ͪͩ, in: De musica, Bücher I und VI: Vom ästhetischen Urteil zur metaphysichen Er-
kenntnis. Ed. and transl. F. Hentschel. Hamburg, Felix Meiner ͪͨͨͪ, p. ͩͩͨ; De quantitate animae 
ͪͫ.ͬͫ. Ed. W. Hörmann. CSEL, Ͱͱ. Wien, Hoelder–Pichler–Tempsky ͩͱͰͮ; Sermones, ͪͯͯ, § ͩͨ. PL 
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elaborate theory in mind while criticizing extramission. According to this 
theory (which he refers to and ascribes to Platonists and Academics), percep-
tion occurs when real corporeal rays are emitted from the eyes all the way 
to the object seen, they grasp the corporeal form of the object and bring this 
form back to the eye.  ese rays are very subtle and lucid bodies (corpora 
subtilissima et lucida) and of a “vaporous” nature. Such a theory seems 
closer to some 12th-century Platonists (such as Bernard of Chartres, William 
of Conches, or Adelard of Bath) than to Augustine.  e distinctive featu re 
of these Platonists’ theories is the conviction that the visual ray not only 
reaches the object, but also grasps its form and brings it back to the observer. 
Such a conviction is present neither in Plato’s nor in Augustine’s theory.
Olivi’s attitude towards such extramissionist theories is ambivalent. 
He explicitly criticizes Platonists, but also defends a quasi-extramissionist 
approach to some optical problems. Reading all the places where he talks 
about visual rays carefully makes it possible to reconstruct Olivi’s two basic 
tenets:
(1) Visual rays as corporeal entities are implausible.
(2)  e visual ray theory is a plausible model for explaining attentional  
   switches.
ͫͰ, col. ͩͪͮͪ–ͫ; he also mentions (in a more Platonic manner) the emission of inner light – see 
Augustinus, De Genesi ad litteram libri duodecim. Ed. J. Zycha. Praha–Wien–Leipzig, F. Tempsky 
ͩͰͱͬ, I, ͩͮ, pp. ͪͪ–ͪͫ; IV, ͫͬ, pp. ͩͫͬ–ͩͫͭ; VII, ͩͬ, p. ͪͩͪ. (See also O’Daly, G., Augustine’s Phi-
losophy of Mind. Berkeley–Los Angeles, University of California Press ͩͱͰͯ, pp. Ͱͪ–Ͱͫ.) Olivi 
quotes some of these passages in Sent. II, q. ͭͰ, II, pp. ͬͰͪ–ͬͰͬ; q. ͯͫ, III, pp. ͭͭ–ͭͰ; Quodl. I, 
q. ͬ, pp. ͩͭ–ͩͮ.
ͪͩ Sent. II, q. ͯͫ, III, p. ͭͭ.
ͪͪ Bernard of Chartres, Glosae super Platonem. Ed. P. E. Dutton. Toronto, PIMS ͩͱͱͩ, II, c. ͯ, p. ͪͨͯ; 
William of Conches, Glosae super Platonem. Ed. E. A. Jeauneau. Turnhout, Brepols ͪͨͨͮ, II, 
c. ͩͫͯ, pp. ͪͬͰ–ͪͬͱ; and William of Conches, Dragmaticon Philosophiae. Ed. I. Ronca – A. Badia. 
Turnhout, Brepols ͩͱͱͯ, VI, ͩͱ, § ͫ–ͭ, pp. ͪͬͬ–ͪͬͭ; Adelard of Bath, Quaestiones naturales. In: 
Adelard of Bath, Conversations with his Nephew: On the Same and the Diﬀ erent, Questions on 
Natural Science, and On Birds. Ed. et transl. Ch. Burnett. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press 
ͩͱͱͰ, c. ͪͫ, pp. ͩͬͨ–ͩͬͪ. William of Conches’s Dragmaticon mentions that the correct explana-
tion of vision is the one held by “Platonists and Academics” (academicam et platonicam sen-
tentiam de uisu, quae sola uera est, prius explanabo); the matter of the ray is also described in 
terms similar to the ones used by Olivi: it is airy (aerea), very subtle (nichil quod sit corporeum 
subtilius esse potest) and Plato calls it fi re (ignis). For some of these authors, see Lindberg, D. C., 
Theories of Vision from al-Kindi to Kepler. Chicago, University of Chicago Press ͩͱͰͩ, pp. ͱͨ–ͱͬ; 
or Smith, A. M., From Sight to Light: The Passage from Ancient to Modern Optics. Chicago, Uni-
versity of Chicago Press ͪͨͩͭ, pp. ͪͫͯ–ͪͬͩ. 
ͪͫ See esp. Sent. II, q. ͭͰ, II, pp. ͬͰͪ–ͬͰͬ; ͬͰͮ–ͬͱͱ; q. ͯͫ, III, pp. ͭͪ–ͩͨͮ.
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Olivi criticized (1) the notion that visual rays as corporeal bodies come 
forth from our eyes.  ese strange bodies would be susceptible to all the 
changes of the medium. Hence, our vision would be aﬀ ected by hot or cold 
air or by winds, which obviously is not the case.  us, a theory postulating 
corporeal rays is blended from impossible, improbable and (for the explana-
tion of perception) useless claims – and, according to Olivi, nobody actually 
held it at the time (nullus hodie sequitur).
Olivi does not deny (2) the framework of the extramission theory of vision. 
 ere are obvious parallels between Platonists’ and Olivi’s accounts. For 
example, both stress that the primary impulse for perception comes not 
from the object, but from the activity of a sense.  e sense must perform an 
action for perception to occur – while for Platonists (and Augustine) such 
action amounts to an emission of corporeal rays from our eyes, for Olivi the 
action consists in focusing attention.
Further, Olivi seems to imply that the postulate of visual rays can be 
a plausible model for describing attentional states. He stresses several times 
that perceptual attention can be understood as rays of a sort coming forth 
from the sensory organs – with one important qualiﬁ cation: these “rays 
of attention” are not corporeal bodies, but rather the spiritual or virtual 
traces of our attentional switching.	 Hence, where Augustine and Platonists 
speak about corporeal rays, Olivi introduces “virtual rays” (radii virtuales).

What takes place is not an actual emission of a subtle matter from our 
sensory organs, but rather a dynamic of consciousness – attention has an 
“eﬀ ort” (conatus), a “tendency” (inclinatio) and an “onset” (impetus) and these 
dynamic features bring about attentional switching. Before a perception 
can occur, we are in an attentive state: our attention is dynamic and the 
virtual rays of our eyes penetrate the surrounding medium, scanning the 
ͪͬ Esp. Sent. II, q. ͯͫ, III, pp. ͭͱ–ͮͩ. His arguments against such a position are traditional and in fact 
similar to the ones advanced by Avicenna or Albert the Great.
ͪͭ Ibid., p. ͭͱ.
ͪͮ Sent. II, q. ͭͰ, II, p. ͬͰͪ.
ͪͯ Ibid., p. ͬ ͱͨ: “[…] virtus visiva, secundum hoc quod habet aspectum virtualem in organo corporeo 
existente, secundum hoc potest dici habere radium virtualem. Qui radius non est aliud quam ipse 
aspectus sic virtualiter protensus […]”
ͪͰ Sent. II, q. ͯͫ, III, p. ͮͯ: “[…] aspectus visivus non transeat realiter per medium ad rem visam: 
nihilominus non est communiter aptus natus aspicere res nisi per lineam rectam […]”
ͪͱ Sent. II, q. ͭͰ, II, p. ͬͱͬ: “Et hunc modum posuit Augustinus, hoc excepto quod ubi isti ponunt 
radios virtuales, ipse posuit radios corporales.” See also ibid., p. ͬͰͰ (where Olivi speaks about 
extramissio virtualis virtutis visivae), ͬͱͨ, ͬͱͬ and ͬͱͱ (where radii virtuales are mentioned). 
The term virtualis can have two meanings here: virtual as opposed to real, actual, or corporeal; 
and virtual as derived from the visual power (vis).
ͫͨ Ibid., p. ͬͱͨ: “[…] ex naturali inclinatione et impetu virtutis aspicientis seu ipsius aspectus fi t ipsa 
mutatio in ipso aspectu […]”; also ibid., p. ͬͮͮ.
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environment and “stretching” towards the objects. When the rays of atten-
tion encounter an obstacle (the object seen), our attention suddenly becomes 
“stiﬀ er”.  en, the dynamic of our attention becomes quiet and stabilized 
(quiescit et stabilitur) and the attention is ﬁ xed upon the object.
Once the attention is ﬁ xed, the sensory power creates a perceptual act 
with the proper content and we perceive the concrete thing. Hence, from 
the causal point of view, the perceptual act depends primarily on the percep-
tual power as its eﬃ  cient cause. However, its content depends on the object 
grasped by the act, which serves as – in Olivi’s words – its “terminative” or 
“objective” cause (causa terminativa or obiectiva). Olivi bestows this special 
kind of causality on the material objects because they can exert an inﬂ uence 
both on the aspectus (they ﬁ x or switch the attention) and on the perceptual 
acts (objects determine the contents of perceptual acts). However, the causal 
inﬂ uence of the objects (i) is not an eﬃ  cient one (in such case, the ontolog-
ical superiority of the soul’s power would be compromised) and (ii) is only 
secondary (objects can exert it only once the aspectus or the perceptual act 
have been eﬃ  ciently caused by the power).
Further, Olivi suggests that the diﬀ erent states of attention can be used 
even in classifying entities in the world; namely, for distinguishing between 
the transparent media and the opaque objects:  e nature of the medium (air 
or water) is such that it is not able to stabilize the dynamic of our attention 
and the attentional ray penetrates it. On the contrary, perceptible objects 
can settle the dynamic of attention – the ray cannot go further behind the 
object. However, there is also a third kind of entity that is neither an object 
nor a medium, namely, a mirror. Hence, a few words on Olivi’s view of mirror 
perception should be spent – i.e., how he describes the situations when we 
perceive an object by means of a ray reﬂ ected by a mirror.
 e main feature of mirrors Olivi is concerned with is not their optical 
properties, but rather their role in attentional switching. Mirrors switch the 
ͫͩ Sent. II, q. ͯͫ, III, p. ͮͮ: “Quando enim sic aspicit obiectum quod tota inclinatio et impendentia 
perfecte quiescit et stabilitur, et tota eius capacitas ex cognitiva apprehensione obiecti repletur 
et occupatur, […] tunc dicitur perfecte fi gi et terminari in illo obiecto […]” Such a fi xation is not 
a material contact, but rather a stabilization of the dynamic of our attention: “[…] aspectus 
non dicitur fi gi in obiecto per […] materialem contactum, sed solum per hoc quod huius ad illud 
inclinatio et impendentia fi rmiter quietatur […]” – ibid., p. ͩͨͭ.
ͫͪ See e.g. Sent. II, q. ͭͰ, II, pp. ͬͩͬ–ͬͩͭ, ͬͩͱ; q. ͮͩ, II, p. ͭͯͯ; q. ͯͪ, III, pp. ͩͨ–ͩͪ, ͫͭ–ͫͱ; q. ͯͭ, III, 
p. ͩͬͬ and Pasnau, R., Theories of Cognition in the Later Middle Ages, op. cit., pp. ͩͩͱ–ͩͪͩ; Perler, 
D., Theorien der Intentionalität im Mittelalter, op. cit., pp. ͩͫͫ–ͩͫͬ, ͩͫͯ; Toivanen, J., Perception 
and the Internal Senses, op. cit., pp. ͩͬͭ–ͩͭͨ; Silva, J. F., Medieval Theories of Active Perception, 
op. cit., pp. ͩͫͫ. For a non-causal reading of the determination of perceptual content in Olivi, 
cf. Adriaenssen, H. T., Peter John Olivi on Perceptual Representation. Vivarium, ͬͱ, ͪͨͩͩ, No. ͬ, 
pp. ͫͫͱ–ͫͬͮ.
ͫͫ Sent. II, q. ͯͫ, III, pp. ͮͮ–ͮͯ.
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direction of our attention and hence we can see what is actually outside 
of our visual ﬁ eld. According to Olivi, mirrors are peculiar objects – they are 
neither common perceptible objects, nor transparent media.  ey resemble 
objects in being obstacles to the rays of our attention,– but the attention 
cannot be ﬁ xed on them in the same way as it would be on common objects. 
Objects resist attention in a “hard and harsh” (dura et aspera) way and the 
sight simply cannot attend any further behind the thing. Although in the 
case of mirrors attention also cannot go behind the mirror, it resists atten-
tion in a “plain and sweet” (planus et suavis) way and hence the attention’s 
direction is reﬂ ected from the mirror very easily and without diﬃ  culty. Such 
a mild resistance is also the reason why for an observer the reﬂ ection is 
insensible.
Olivi models the reﬂ ection of attention on the reﬂ ection of a ray of light. 
Hence, the ray of attention is reﬂ ected according to what we would nowa-
days call the law of reﬂ ection: the angles between the mirror’s surface and 
the incident or reﬂ ected ray are equal. Visual attention is thus subordinated 
to the laws of optics.
ͫͬ It may seem that Olivi advocates a bizarre and confused claim: attention as a psychological 
property adopts some optical features proper to light as a physical entity. Thus, the ray of at-
tention is subject to refl ection from polished bodies, such as mirrors, or to refraction when it 
passes through media with diﬀ erent (optical) density. However, such a confl ation of psychol-
ogy of sight and physics of light was a common feature of premodern optics before Kepler. 
Ancient and medieval optics often formulated refl ection or refraction not as a physical event 
(how light is refl ected or refracted), but rather as a psychological event (how things are seen 
and appear when they are observed by means of a mirror or a lens). See Smith, A. M., What is 
the History of Medieval Optics Really About? Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society, 
ͩͬͰ, ͪͨͨͬ, No. ͪ, pp. ͩͰͨ–ͩͱͬ, who describes the transition between the oculocentric premod-
ern and the luminocentric modern optics as revolutionary.
ͫͭ Sent. II, q. ͯͫ, III, p. ͮͯ.
ͫͮ Ibid., pp. ͯͪ–ͯͫ.
ͫͯ Sent. II, q. ͯͫ, III, p. ͮͯ: “Sciendum ergo quod sicut luci corporali et potentiae visivae est naturale 
quod aspiciant et transeant sua media per lineas rectas: sic est eis naturale quod suum aspectum 
a speculo dirigant in oppositam partem et hoc sub quadam conformitate, ut in hoc ipso quae-
dam naturalis et recta proportio observetur, ut scilicet angulus seu angularis conus refl exionis 
a speculo sit aequalis angulo seu cono sub quo prior aspectus terminatur in speculo.” For the Law 
of Refl ection from ancient to late medieval science see Takahashi, K., The Medieval Traditions 
of Euclid’s Catoptrica. Fukuoka-sh, Kyushu University Press ͩͱͱͪ, pp. ͫͱ–ͯͫ. Olivi mentions that 
the optical scientists (perspectivi) of the time call these equal angles the “angle of incidence” 
(angulus incidentiae) and the “angle of refl ection” (angulus refl exionis) – see Sent. II, q. ͯͫ, III, 
p. ͯͨ. Such terminology is introduced by Roger Bacon, De multiplicatione specierum. Ed. D. C. 
Lindberg. In: Lindberg, D. C., Roger Bacon’s Philosophy of Nature. Oxford, Clarendon Press ͩͱͰͫ 
(abbrev. DMS), II, ͮ, p. ͩͫͮ. Olivi was acquainted with Bacon’s De multiplicatione specierum and 
quotes him in Sent. II, q. ͭͰ, II, pp. ͬͱͩ–ͬͱͪ as one of the “followers of Arab optics” (sequentes 
perspectivam Arabum). Note that Olivi formulates what is nowadays called “law of refl ection” 
in a way more traditional in medieval optics: the angles in question are included between one 
of the rays and the surface of the mirror. See e.g. Euclid, De speculis, prop. I. Ed. K. Takahashi, 
in: Takahashi, K., The Medieval Traditions of Euclid’s Catoptrica, op. cit., pp. ͩͩͮ–ͩͩͰ, ͪͩͬ, ͪͱͮ. On 
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However, Olivi’s account of mirror perception poses several problems. For 
example, if what is reﬂ ected by the mirror is our visual attention, why are we 
not aware of such a reﬂ ection? It is a general phenomenological fact that in 
mirror perception, the sight does not perceive the reﬂ ection itself – we see 
the object as if it were directly in front of us and located directly on the ray 
by means of which we see it.	 Olivi proposes two solutions to this puzzle. 
First, the ﬁ rst part of the ray of attention (between the eyes and the mirror) 
is stronger and more principal, while the second part (from the mirror to the 
object seen) is weaker and secondary.  e ﬁ rst part is so heavily forced upon 
our sight that we feel as if the part of the attentional ray after the reﬂ ection 
were in the direction of the ﬁ rst part. Second, the resistance of the mirror 
is very mild and thus insensible: and when the soul does something easily, 
it does so without noticing it.  us, the ray is reﬂ ected but we do not notice 
that.

Another problem is what causes the reﬂ ection of the aspectus. At ﬁ rst 
sight, the mirror itself does not seem to be the right candidate – after all, 
it is a material object unable to aﬀ ect the cognitive power of the spiritual 
soul.  erefore, Olivi tends to employ twofold causality, as in the issue of the 
causation of the perceptual act. He holds that the reﬂ ection is eﬃ  ciently 
caused by the cognitive power (it follows from the nature of aspectus itself ) 
and the mirror is only an objective or terminative cause.
To conclude: Olivi’s account of perception is characterized by a special 
emphasis on the role of attention in the perceptual process. Attention (esp. 
the visual one) is described as a virtual ray coming forth from the eyes, scan-
ning the environment and ﬁ xed on an object. Mirrors are special objects, 
which switch the direction of our attention without making us aware of such 
a reﬂ ection.
the contrary, Ptolemy (and contemporary optics) defi nes the angles of incidence and refl ection 
as angles between either the incident or refl ected ray and the perpendicular erected at the 
point of refl exion. See ibid., p. ͫͪͮ.
ͫͰ Such a fact was often declared by optical scientists: even if we see by means of a mirror, all 
we see appears to be in front of us. See e.g. the second postulate of Euclid’s De speculis: “Visa 
omnia recte videri.” – De speculis, p. ͩͩͬ.
ͫͱ Sent. II, q. ͯͫ, III, p. ͯͩ; see also q. ͫͯ, I, p. ͮͯͩ.
ͬͨ Sent. II, q. ͯͫ, III, p. ͮͰ: “Speculum vero est causa obiectiva, quia ex natura quam habet sic termi-
nandi aspectum et sic non terminandi cooperatur praedictae refl exioni ipsius aspectus.” See also 
ibid., pp. Ͱͱ, ͩͨͫ–ͩͨͬ where he explicitly states that all the variations of the aspectus depend 
on the objects – not as on eﬃ  cient causes, but as on terminative ones.
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3. Peter Auriol and perceptual content
Now I proceed to the account of active perception advanced by another 
Franciscan philosopher, Peter Auriol. For Auriol, perception is, above all, 
a matter of appearance: seeing an object amounts to the fact that this object 
appears to us., What is, however, the status of appearances? Auriol believes 
that things do not appear just by themselves – they appear only when they 
are grasped by a living being’s cognitive power. Only the power’s activity can 
complete the perceptual act – namely by producing a conscious perceptual 
content.
Auriol therefore addresses the issue of the senses’ (and other cognitive 
powers’) activity primarily in terms of causality and productivity. Unlike 
Olivi, Auriol does not propose any dualism concerning the sensory powers: 
the senses are not parts of an immaterial soul, but rather proceed from the 
conjunction of the soul and the sensory organs. An important consequence 
is that material objects can exert an inﬂ uence on our sensory powers. Our 
sensory organs are obviously aﬀ ected by material objects – Auriol points 
out the example of damage to sensory organs caused by excessively strong 
ͬͩ For Auriol’s account of sensory perception, see e.g. Tachau, K. H., Vision and Certitude in the 
Age of Ockham, op. cit., pp. Ͱͱ–ͩͨͨ; Denery, D. G., The Appearance of Reality: Peter Aureol and 
the Experience of Perceptual Error. Franciscan Studies, ͭͭ, ͩͱͱͰ, pp. ͩͯ–ͭͪ; Perler, D., Theorien 
der Intentionalität im Mittelalter, op. cit., pp. ͪͭͰ–ͪͰͫ; and Lička, L., Perception and Objective 
Being: Peter Auriol on Perceptual Acts and their Objects. American Catholic Philosophical Quar-
terly, ͱͨ, ͪͨͩͮ, No. ͩ, pp. ͬͱ–ͯͮ.
ͬͪ See Peter Auriol, Electronic Scriptum. Ed. R. L. Friedman; L. O. Nielsen; C. Schabel. URL: <http://
www.peterauriol.net/editions/electronicscriptum/> (abbrev. Scriptum, E-Scriptum), d. ͫͭ, p. ͩ, 
a. ͩ, lin. ͫͭͫ–ͫͭͭ: “[…] videre consistit in habere aliquid sibi praesens per modum apparentis, nihil 
enim aliud est dicere aliquid videri alicui quam illud sibi apparere. Unde cum videmus aliquid, ex 
hoc videre dicimur quod aliquid nobis apparet.”
ͬͫ On the contrary, the extramissionist notion of (visual) activity is completely lacking in Auriol’s 
account. In his days, extramission was apparently regarded as an old-fashioned theory and 
the general attitude of scholars towards it was dismissive. As far as I am aware, Auriol only 
mentions it in his early Repercussorium: the extramissionist hypothesis is presented there as 
an example of some absurd claims made by some saints and especially Augustine: “[…] dicta 
sanctorum confi rmata sunt per ecclesiam, non, ut omnino sint necessaria ad credendum et eorum 
oppositum sit erroneum […] multas etiam absurditates pro veritatibus confi rmasset, ut: quod 
visio fi at per radiorum extramissionem, secundum quod dicit Augustinus […]” – Peter Auriol, 
Repercussorium. In: Gulielmi Guarrae, Ioannis Duns Scoti, Petri Aureoli Quaestiones disputatae 
de Immaculata Conceptione Beatae Mariae Virginis. Quaracchi, Collegium S. Bonaventurae ͩͱͨͬ, 
p. ͩͬͰ. For the context, see Duba, W., The Immaculate Conception in the Works of Peter Auriol. 
Vivarium, ͫͰ, ͪͨͨͨ, No. ͩ, p. ͪͮ.
ͬͬ Peter Auriol, Reportatio. In: Peter Auriol, Commentariorum in secundum, tertium, et quartum 
Sententiarum. Roma, Aloysius Zanetti ͩͮͨͭ (abbrev. Rep.), IV, d. ͬͭ, q. ͩ, p. ͪͩͫaE: “[Potentiae 
sensitivae] non possunt dici radicaliter et causaliter fl uere ab anima, sed a coniuncto […] non sunt 
determinative tantum ab anima, sed ab aliqua alia forma complexionali totius organi concurrente 
cum anima.”
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stimuli: an excessively loud sound harms our auditory ability, an excessively 
bright colour can produce an afterimage in our vision, and some odours can 
cause a runny nose. From the fact that the sensory organs are aﬀ ected 
Auriol infers that they are receptive of qualities of the objects also in the 
sensory process – he calls this kind of quality a species, similitudo (since it is 
similar to the object) or impression.
However, to suﬀ er an aﬀ ection is not yet to perceive – if it were, even 
a medium would be capable of perception, since it receives species. An active 
response from the sensory power is also necessary for perception to occur. 
Hence, perception (and cognition generally) is both passive and active: it is 
passive insofar as the sensory power undergoes a change and receives a real 
impression (pati realiter), and it is active insofar as it responds to stimuli 
with intentional actions (agere intentionaliter).
For Auriol, the passive aspect of perception is of lesse r signiﬁ cance – the 
concrete causal way by means of which the species of the object is received 
is not as important as the way in which it is cognitively processed. Just 
like Olivi, Auriol cites the phenomenon of selective attention: although some 
stimuli from the object in the visual ﬁ eld are received in the sensory power, 
it need not be perceived, if the person concerned is deep in thought about 
something else.	
For Auriol, the “intentional action” performed by our sensory powers is 
the most important aspect of perception. What is this intentional action? 
First of all, it is worth noting that the term “intentional” does not mean 
“intended” or “voluntary” here. In Auriol, “intentional” is predicated about 
entities whose existence and occurrence is dependent on the cognitive act 
of a cognitive agent (the opposite term is “real”, predicated about things that 
exist even when they are not cognized).
Scholastic philosophers often distinguished between two kinds of action: 
transitive and intransitive or immanent.  e distinction is based on the 
nature of their products: while transitive actions (such as cutting a carrot 
or building a house) produce something other than themselves (the pieces 
of carrot or the house built), immanent actions allegedly produce nothing 
other than themselves.  e traditional Aristotelian example of an immanent 
ͬͭ Ibid., d. ͬͬ, q. ͬ, p. ͪͩͨbD–F.
ͬͮ Scriptum, d. ͪ ͯ, p. ͪ , a. ͪ , E-Scriptum, lin. ͭ ͫͰ–ͭͬͨ, also Peter Auriol, Quodlibeta sexdecim. Roma, 
Aloysius Zanetti ͩͮͨͭ (abbrev. Quodl.), q. Ͱ, p. ͰͯaD.
ͬͯ Such an attitude has important consequences: for example, it allows Auriol to include cases 
of sensory illusion in his theory of perception. Illusions are simply situations when the spe-
cies received in our senses are somehow distorted, the information about the external world 
included in them is imperfect and in processing them the senses produce a non-veridical act 
of per ception. See Lička, L., Perception and Objective Being, op. cit., pp. ͮͱ–ͯͭ.
ͬͰ Scriptum, d. ͫͭ, p. ͩ, a. ͪ, E-Scriptum, lin. ͯͨͪ–ͯͨͰ.
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action is vision: when we see, we produce nothing other than the very act 
of seeing.

In Auriol this distinction is slightly reinterpreted. He believes that cogni-
tion is action; however, he does not agree that cognitive actions are imma-
nent in the sense of not having any product. His point of departure is the 
intuition that actions that leave a product are expressed by transitive verbs, 
i.e., verbs demanding an object.  e verb “to live” (vivere) is not transitive, 
since one cannot say “I live this or that”. But the verb “to see” (videre) is transi-
tive, since one can say “I see you or him”. So there is a transitive element even 
in the immanent cognitive action of seeing: it must produce something. At 
ﬁ rst sight, it may seem implausible: does seeing have a product similar to the 
house produced by the activity of building?
Auriol points out that even some actions that are ends in themselves 
(and, hence, are immanent) do have a product: for example, playing a lute or 
singing produces sounds, albeit the sounds do not persist when the action 
has ﬁ nished. Similarly, a cognitive action has a product in intentional or 
objective being (esse intentionale or obiectivum): it does not remain once the 
cognitive act has ceased to exist. So the product of a cognitive action has 
only intentional being and is wholly dependent on the occurrence of the 
proper cognitive act.  e action responsible for the production of inten-
tional being is called “intentional” – not in the sense that the action itself 
were dependent of the cognitive activity, but with a modiﬁ ed meaning as 
“having an intentionally existing product”.
Now, what is the product of such an intentional action? Auriol’s answer 
involves his idiosyncratic term: an intentional action produces the “apparent 
being” of the thing cognized (esse intentionale or esse apparens). As I have 
mentioned, Auriol often talks about “appearances” and generally tends to 
understand all experience as a kind of appearance. Such an experience 
comprises two components, an objective one and a formal one – there is 
something that is appearing and something by means of which it appears.  e 
latter component – called “formal appearance” (apparitio formalis) – is the 
cognitive act itself that really exists in the sensory power. On the other hand, 
“objective appearance” (apparitio obiectiva) is what appears in the act. It 
ͬͱ The distinction is implied in Aristotle, Metaphysica IX, ͮ, ͩͨͬͰb; IX, Ͱ, ͩͨͭͨa–b; it is explicitly 
proposed e.g. by Aquinas, Summa theologiae I, q. ͭͬ, a. ͪ; I, q. Ͱͭ, a. ͪ.
ͭͨ Scriptum, d. ͪͯ, p. ͪ, a. ͪ, E-Scriptum, lin. ͭͪͯ–ͭͪͱ.
ͭͩ Ibid., lin. ͭͬͫ–ͭͭͪ.
ͭͪ Peter Auriol, Scriptum super primum Sententiarum. Ed. E. M. Buytaert. ͪ vols. St. Bonaventure 
(NY), The Franciscan Institute ͩ ͱͭͪ–ͩͱͭͮ (abbrev. Scriptum, Buytaert), d. ͭ , q. ͩ ͯ, § ͩ ͨͯ, II, p. ͯ ͱͱ: 
“Ex apparitione enim formali, quae est in mente actus intelligendi, oritur apparitio obiectiva rosae 
[…] non producitur aliqua res, sed res et apparitio constituunt unum simplex apparens […]”
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only exists intentionally or apparently: an objective appearance exists only 
as long as a cognitive act is grasping it.
To some extent, objective appearance can be understood as the content 
of a cognitive act. It brings a conscious and phenomenal aspect and a ﬁ rst-
-person perspective into cognition. Auriol points out that cognition includes 
more than mere representation (that also obtains between a picture and the 
person depicted).  ere is also a conscious aspect, since the cognized thing is 
“given” to the observer and it is in his “consciousness” (Auriol uses the Augus-
tinian terms prospectus and conspectus). On the other hand, Auriol some-
times underscores that, especially in perception, the “appearance” is outside 
of our mind in the external world. It is the thing itself insofar as it appears to 
us. In normal circumstances, the appearance is something indisting uish-
ably bound (indistinguibiliter adunatum) to the thing – normally, when we 
perceive a thing, we do not even notice that we are actively engaged in the 
thing’s appearing by intentionally producing its appearance.	
Hence, the nature of esse apparens or objective appearance as Auriol 
conceives it is peculiarly dual.
  e crucial aspect of this reading of Auriol is 
that, strictly speaking, esse apparens is neither in the soul or its powers, nor 
in the external world. Such a dual nature of esse apparens becomes obvious 
if we consider Auriol’s statements about where esse apparens is. Focusing on 
ͭͫ Scriptum, d. ͫ, q. ͩͬ, a. ͫ, § ͭͭ, Buytaert II, pp. ͯͩͪ–ͯͩͫ: “[…] visio est quaedam apparitio in oculo 
existens, ita quod dum res videntur apparent […]”
ͭͬ See King, P., Duns Scotus on Mental Content. In: Boulnois, O. – Karger, E. – Solère, J.-L. – Son-
dag, G. (eds.), Duns Scot à Paris, ͭͯͬͮ–ͮͬͬͮ. Turnhout, Brepols ͪͨͨͬ, pp. ͮͭ–ͰͰ.
ͭͭ Peter Auriol, Scriptum super I Sent., dist. ͮͯ. Ed. L. M. De Rijk. In: Giraldus Odonis O. F. M., Opera 
philosophica, vol. ͮ: De intentionibus. Leiden–Boston, Brill ͪͨͨͭ, pp. ͮͱͭ–ͯͬͯ (abbrev. Scriptum, 
De Rijk), here d. ͪͫ, a. ͪ, § ͭͱ, p. ͯͩͬ: “[…] Cesar pictus non est presens aut apparens picture 
nec in conspectu aut prospectu illius nec sibi obicitur aut oﬀ ertur. Sed experientia docet quod res 
cognita est apparens, presens, obiecta intelligenti necnon et in prospectu aut conspectu illius.” 
See also Friedman, R. L., Act, Species, and Appearance. Peter Auriol on Intellectual Cognition 
and Consciousness. In: Klima, G. (ed.), Intentionality, Cognition, and Mental Representation in 
Medieval Philosophy. New York, Fordham University Press ͪͨͩͭ, pp. ͩͬͩ–ͩͮͭ, who emphasizes 
the conscious aspect of cognition in Auriol.
ͭͮ Ibid., § ͭͭ, p. ͯͩͪ: “[…] rerum apparitiones obiectivas […] sunt realiter eedem cum hiis que exis-
tunt extra” or Scriptum, d. ͪͯ, p. ͪ, a. ͪ, E-Scriptum, lin. ͮͬͫ–ͮͬͰ: “[…] res posita in esse formato 
non est aliquid aliud quam res extra sub alio modo essendi. […] vera res habet esse fi ctitium et 
apparens. Nec propter hoc fi t bis, sed idem fi t in duplici esse: realiter quidem exterius in natura, 
intentionaliter vero in mente.”
ͭͯ Scriptum, d. ͪͯ, p. ͪ, a. ͪ, E-Scriptum, lin. ͭͰͫ–ͭͱͰ.
ͭͰ Scriptum, d. ͫ, q. ͩͬ, a. ͩ, § ͫͩ, Buytaert II, p. ͮͱͰ: “[…] non distinguitur imago seu res in esse 
apparenti ab esse reali, quia simul coincidunt in vera visione […]” Auriol stresses that these ap-
pearances are external to us even in the case of sensory illusions – see ibid., pp. ͮͱͮ–ͮͱͯ; and 
Pasnau, R., Theories of Cognition in the Later Middle Ages, op. cit., pp. ͯͪ–ͯͮ.
ͭͱ I have argued for such a reading of Auriol extensively in Lička, L., Perception and Objective Be-
ing, op. cit. See also Denery, D. G., The Appearance of Reality, op. cit., pp. ͫͮ–ͫͯ, who empha-
sizes the double nature of esse apparens.
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the fact that the appearance of a thing depends on the observer cognizing it, 
he states that esse apparens is in the mind (in mente) or in the consciousness 
(in acie cogitantis) and not in the nature of things regardless of the observer’s 
activity (in rerum natura). On the other hand, Auriol insists that it is the 
very extramental thing what appears – the thing and its appearance are not 
two diﬀ erent things (duo distinguibilia) and, as the case of a mirror image 
expounded below shows, Auriol models the appearances as being outside 
our mind, evincing spatial properties and thus localizable.
 erefore, to understand Auriol’s notion of appearance as either some-
thing strictly mental or something strictly extramental is misleading – 
it is not an ontologically committing and full-ﬂ edged entity at all. Hence, 
no matter how strange it may sound to the modern ears, Auriol seems to 
endorse both that esse apparens is mind-dependent (or dependent on the 
cognitive activity) and that is it outside of our mind (at least in the case 
of sensory perception). Objective appearance depends on the observer in 
that it is produced by his cognitive acts and brings a special subjective feeling 
to the world of causal connections (from a ﬁ rst-person perspective). At the 
same time, however, appearances are bound to the things outside as their 
relational properties, which determine that precisely this thing appears to 
that observer under a certain “mode of appearing” (from this or that side, as 
coloured to the sight, non-veridically in bad conditions, etc.).
We can conclude that active perception as Auriol conceives it consists 
especially in the causal activity of the senses in bringing about the perceptual 
acts and in making their content appear to the subject. Two partial causes 
concur in the elicitation of a cognitive act: the similitude of the real thing 
received in a sensory power and the sensory power itself. Together these 
causes can elicit a cognitive act and make the thing appear, or, in Auriol’s 
words, “give birth to the objective [component of] cognition or put the thing 
into apparent being” (utrumque simul parit notitiam obiectivam sive ponit 
res in esse apparenti).  e sensory power creates the appearance (giving 
“apparent being” to the perceived object), the object and its similitude deter-
mine the appearing thing (ensuring that precisely this and not another thing 
appears). Without extramental things there would be nothing to appear, 
without active minds there would be no possibility of appearing.
ͮͨ Scriptum, d. ͪͯ, p. ͪ, a. ͪ, E-Scriptum, lin. ͭͭͫ–ͭͭͮ; see also the second quotation in note ͭͮ 
above.
ͮͩ Scriptum I, d. Ͱ, q. ͪͫ, a. ͭ, § ͩͮͮ, Buytaert II, p. ͩͨͩͰ: “Res autem apparens non dicit duo distin-
guibilia, quia apparentia rei est modus intrinsecus existendi illius rei.”
ͮͪ Scriptum, d. ͱ, p. ͩ, a. ͩ, E-Scriptum, lin. ͫͱͬ–ͫͱͯ.
ͮͫ Quodl. q. Ͱ, a. ͫ, p. ͰͭbD–E: “Habet igitur species in potentia cognitiva, ut faciat apparere, quia 
utrumque potentia scilicet et species, constituunt unum, ad quod sequitur obiecti apparentia, ita 
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Finally, I will illustrate Auriol’s account of perception using the example 
of mirror perception.  e main feature of mirror perception Auriol is inter-
ested in is not attentional switching (as Olivi was), but rather the nature 
of the images we see in mirrors. Investigating mirror images was a traditional 
part of medieval optics (perspectiva) – but the main issue for the perspectiv-
istae was how to determine the location of an image using geometry. On the 
contrary, Auriol’s fundamental interest is the metaphysical nature of mirror 
images.  e notion of a mirror-image is also a perfect manifestation of Auri-
ol’s notion of esse apparens.
When Auriol investigates the nature of mirror images, he looks for an 
answer using a process of elimination.  e ﬁ rst option he discusses is to 
understand the image as a species: a real quality impressed in the mirror. If 
that were the case, images would inhere in the mirror in the same way as 
a redness inheres in an apple. However, this option is not viable: no accident 
can exceed its subject, but images sometimes can be bigger than the mirror 
(when it mirrors a tower or the heavens). Another option is that the image 
is the thing itself really existing beneath the surface of the mirror.  at is not 
plausible, either, since when someone looks in a mirror, his face is obviously 
not behind the mirror, although it appears there. If it were the case, the 
image would be the same from whatever angle we observed it. Hence, such 
a conception would reify the appearance.  ere is also the opposite option: 
since the image is dependent on the observation, it could be reduced to the 
act of perception existing in the eyes (or elsewhere in the observer’s sensory 
organs). However, Auriol rejects this solution, too: the image cannot be in 
the observer because it appears in the mirror outside the observer’s mind.	 
quod quia esse apparens est esse vitale, quod sit haec apparitio, est ex potentia; quod vero sit talis 
res sub ista apparitione, est ex specie ipsa.”
ͮͬ For Auriol on the metaphysics of mirror images, see esp. Scriptum, d. ͩ, q. ͮ, a. ͬ, § ͩͨͪ, Buytaert 
I, pp. ͫͮͮ–ͫͮͯ; d. ͫ, q. ͩͬ, a. ͩ, § ͫͩ, Buytaert II, p. ͮͱͯ, and Scriptum, d. ͫͭ, p. ͪ, a. ͪ, E-Scriptum, 
lin. ͬͱͨ–ͬͱͱ. The only mention of Auriol’s account of mirrors in the literature I am aware of is in 
Davenport, A., Esse Egressus and Esse Apparens in Peter Auriol’s Theory of Intentional Being. 
Mediaevalia Philosophica Polonorum, ͫͭ, ͪͨͨͮ, No. ͩ, pp. ͮͫ–ͮͭ.
ͮͭ Scriptum, d. ͫ, q. ͩͬ, a. ͩ, § ͫͩ, Buytaert II, p. ͮͱͯ: “Talis autem imago vel est species realis quae 
intimatur subiective in speculo; et hoc poni non potest ut demonstrat Perspectivus libro IV, tum 
quia maior est imago quam sit speculum, cum videatur in eo aliquando una turris vel medium 
caelum, – nullum autem accidens excedit suum subiectum […]”
ͮͮ Ibid.: “Vel illa imago ponetur ipsa vera res habens esse reale; et hoc esse non potest, quia facies 
non est realiter infra speculum, ubi species ipsa apparet.”
ͮͯ Ibid.: “[…] aliqui imaginantur quod imagines sint in speculo […]sive videantur sive non videantur, 
hoc utique falsum est. Tunc enim sequeretur quod haberent verum esse reale.”
ͮͰ Ibid.: “Vel dicetur quod imago illa est visio existens in oculo vel aliquid aliud ibi existens; quod esse 
non potest, cum appareat infra speculum et in situ diverso, ut Perspectivus probat.”
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 erefore, the only viable option is that a mirror image is only an appearance 
of the thing or the thing itself insofar as it has apparent being in the mirror.

 e conclusion Auriol reaches is not an original one, of course. Many 
scholars of his age proposed the same or similar solution of the issue. 
However, whereas they only point out that a mirror image is an external 
appearance of a thing, Auriol is better equipped to account for the meta-
physical nature of mirror images – he has a more robust terminological and 
theoretical framework of the notion of esse apparens.
 us, a mirror image is the esse apparens of the appearing thing. As I argue 
above, esse apparens of a perceived object is neither mental nor extramental: 
it is dependent on perception, just as a mirror image is dependent on the 
observer’s position, but also external to the mind, just as the image is not in 
the eyes, but in the mirror – allowing for optics to investigate its location by 
means of the laws of geometry.
Note that the case of a mirror image is well suited to illustrate the pecu-
liar nature of esse apparens. Although it is (partially) caused by the visual 
power, it is not in the power but outside it. But why is the appearance not 
bound to the thing seen, as in the case of normal perception? While Auriol 
does not address the issue explicitly, he may be saying that the causal chain 
behind such a visual process is intercepted by the presence of the mirror 
with the result that the appearance is separated from the appearing thing.
However, Auriol does not think that the mirror image is what we see in 
mirror perception – a mirror image is not a representation or a sign by which 
the object would be primarily seen and by means of which we would see the 
external thing. He holds that in normal perception we perceive directly the 
things themselves; although we perceive them only insofar as they appear 
to us: our perception grasps the appearance of the thing, or the thing in 
apparent being, but our perception is direct. Similarly, in mirror perception 
our vision terminates in the mirror image and does not reﬂ ect to the thing; 
ͮͱ Ibid.: “Relinquitur igitur quod sit sola apparentia rei vel res habens esse apparens et intentionale, 
ita ut ipsamet res sit infra speculum in esse viso iudicato et apparenti.”; also Scriptum, d. ͩ, q. ͮ, 
a. ͬ, § ͩͨͪ, Buytaert I, p. ͫͮͮ: “Imagines enim eiusdem rei, in speculo apparentes, sunt quidem 
ipsa res quae apparet, et non aliquid impressum speculis, ut manifeste demonstrat Alacenus in 
Perspectiva libro IV.”
ͯͨ See Alhacen’s account (which Auriol refers to) in Alhacen, De aspectibus, IV–V. In: Smith, A. 
M., Alhacen on the Principles of Refl ection. ͪ vols. Philadelphia, American Philosophical Society 
ͪͨͨͮ, IV, ͬ, pp. ͫͯ–ͫͰ; also Roger Bacon, Perspectiva. Ed. D. C. Lindberg. In: Lindberg, D. C., 
Roger Bacon and the Origins of Perspectiva in the Middle Ages. Oxford, Oxford University Press 
ͩͱͱͮ, III, d. ͩ, c. ͪ, ͫ, pp. ͪͭͰ, ͪͮͮ; Bacon, DMS II, ͭ, pp. ͩͫͪ–ͩͫͮ; or John Peckham, Perspectiva 
communis. Ed. D. C. Lindberg. In: Lindberg, D. C., John Pecham and the Science of Optics. Madi-
son–London, University of Wisconsin Press ͩ ͱͯͨ, II, prop. ͩͱ, pp. ͩͮͰ–ͩͯͨ. Peter Olivi also points 
out that a mirror image is not a species, but the thing itself seen out of its place – see Sent. II, 
q. ͭͰ, II, pp. ͬͱͰ–ͬͱͱ; q. ͯͫ, III, pp. ͮͱ–ͯͩ.
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the mirror image is nothing other than the thing itself, albeit appearing to 
be beneath the surface of the mirror. Seeing the mirror image, we perceive 
the thing itself in an undiminished way – we can touch our face and clean a 
stain on it, although all that is in our visual ﬁ eld is an image of it in a mirror).
4. Conclusion
In this paper I aimed mainly to demonstrate that the notion of activity 
involved in perception may encompass several meanings. I introduced two 
medieval accounts to illustrate this point. Both were developed by Fran-
ciscan philosophers – Peter Olivi and Peter Auriol – between late 13th and 
early 14th century.  e two accounts diﬀ er already in their initial assump-
tions: Olivi – inﬂ uenced by the Augustinian worldview – tends to dualism 
and consequently plays down the causal role of material objects in bringing 
about perception while underscoring the causality of the sensory powers. 
By contrast, Auriol – being a more Aristotelian-minded thinker – admits 
that objects can exert a causal inﬂ uence on the sensory powers and that 
the activity of the senses consists in actively processing the information 
received in the senses.
 erefore, the two philosophers advocated diﬀ erent notions of active 
perception. According to Olivi, attention and attentional switching is neces-
sary for perception to occur. Attention is then described in terms derived 
from the extramissionist tradition of optics – Olivi understands attention 
as a virtual ray or spotlight of a kind. Once attention is ﬁ xed upon an object, 
the sensory power can eﬃ  ciently cause a perceptual act. On the other hand, 
Auriol maintains that the sensory powers receive similitudes or species from 
objects and then actively process them. Once a similitude is received, the 
sensory power performs a special kind of action, whose product is a percep-
tual content.  is perceptual content (called “objective appearance” or 
“apparent being”) is something produced by the cognitive act, but at the same 
time something indistinguishably bound to the perceived thing. Hence, the 
ͯͩ Scriptum, d. ͩ, q. ͮ, a. ͬ, § ͩͨͪ, Buytaert I, p. ͫͮͯ: “Quod enim imago quae apparet in speculo sit 
res quae videtur, claret ex hoc quod intuitus visionis terminatur ad illam imaginem ultimate, nec 
refl ectitur ab illa super rem.”
ͯͪ Scriptum, d. ͫͭ, p. ͪ, a. ͪ, E-Scriptum, lin. ͬͱͪ–ͬͱͱ: “[Imago in speculo] diﬀ erret realiter a re extra 
speculum existente, quae diceretur visa denominative per hoc quod res alia, videlicet imago ex-
istens in speculo, terminaret intuitum videntis. Nec tamen minus propter hoc res exterior denomi-
native videretur, immo aspiciens illam imaginem operari posset circa rem exteriorem, utpote circa 
propriam faciem maculam abstergendo vel componendo et ornando aut super ipsam secundum 
situs varios manus ducendo. Diceretur igitur aequipollenter et aeque perfecte proprium vultum 
cernere per hoc quod imago distincta realiter et existens in speculo intuitum terminaret, ac si 
ipsamet facies existeret in speculo et terminaret aspectum.”
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appearance is the extramental thing insofar as it is put into apparent being 
and appearing to the observer.
Finally, I considered the two accounts in the context of mirror perception. 
For Olivi, mirrors are a special sort of objects whose proper job is to switch 
the direction of the observer’s attention. Since an attentional ray can neither 
penetrate the mirror nor be ﬁ xed upon it, it is reﬂ ected to the other side – 
according to the laws of geometrical optics. For Auriol, mirrors have the 
peculiar property of being able to separate the perceived object from objec-
tive appearance. A mirror image is not a representation, but the thing itself 
insofar as it appears to an observer.
ABSTR ACT
In the paper I argue that medieval philosophers proposed several notions of the sens-
es’ activity in perception. I illustrate the point using the example of two Franciscan 
thinkers – Peter Olivi (ca. 1248–1298) and Peter Auriol (ca. 1280–1322). Olivi’s no-
tion of active perception assumes that every perceptual act demands a prior focusing 
of the mind’s attention. Furthermore, Olivi is partially inspired by the extramission-
ist theories of vision and reinterprets the notion of a visual ray postulated by them as 
a useful model for explaining attention and attentional shifts. In Auriol’s view, per-
ception is active because it participates in producing a perceptual content.  e senses 
not only receive information from the environment, they also actively process it and, 
in Auriol’s words, put the external object into apparent being.  e peculiar feature 
of Auriol’s account is his obvious tendency to conceive perceptual content as both de-
pendent on our perceptual activity and external to the senses. Finally, I consider the 
two theories in the context of mirror perception – while Olivi focused on the ability 
of mirrors to switch attention’s direction, Auriol investigated the metaphysical na-
ture of mirror images.
Keywords: Peter Olivi, Peter Auriol, perception, attention, visual ray, perceptual con-
tent, mirror perception
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